SOME VARIATIONS ON PHILOSOPHY
Some people talk about a "philosophy" for such things as winning a game, teaching a class, and marketing a product. This kind of talk seems to be mere talk of a "strategy" and hence falls short of what philosophers typically mean by "philosophy." This is a very thin use of the term, in terms of content, and I would not recommend it widely. We have the term "strategy" to cover what is intended with this thin use.
A hint at William Hasker's use of the term "philosophy" emerges from his following claim: "It is clear that neither Jesus nor Paul performed the sorts of activities characteristic of philosophers, then or now. They did not give public lectures on philosophical topics, nor did they accept pupils for instruction in philosophy, or compose treatises on philosophical subjects. So Prof. PAUL K. MOSER-Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago, Department of Philosophy; address for correspondence: 1032 West Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60660-1537; e-mail: pmoser@luc.edu why should we call them philosophers?" (pp. 9-10). It appears, then, that Hasker allows the relevant use of "philosophy" to be determined by the profession of philosophy, specifically by "the sorts of activities characteristic of [professional] philosophers." Professional philosophy, as a practice with various distinctive activities, thus seems to be his standard for what is to count as "philosophy."
Perhaps it is not surprising when a professional philosopher invokes professional philosophy as the standard for what philosophy and philosophers are. Even so, a problem of conceptual circularity threatens, because a notion of "philosophy" is included in a notion of "activities characteristic of [professional] philosophers," given the included notion of "philosophers." One still can ask: When exactly is someone a (professional) philosopher? This question will lead one to settle on when a person is practicing philosophy rather than something else. So, the circularity interferes with clarification of the relevant notion of philosophy.
Even bracketing any problem of conceptual circularity, we cannot simply look at the professional discipline of academic philosophy to find a definition or an adequate clarification of "philosophy." Attention to professional philosophy, as practiced in colleges and universities, reveals that "the profession" is fractured in its portraits of philosophy, including in its core understandings of what philosophy is. This lesson is an empirical matter confirmed by attendance at any of the national meetings, for instance, of the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP). An attentive person will leave the meetings questioning why the remarkably different participants are all called "philosophers," as if they had something intellectually significant in common, such as a method of inquiry. It seems that no easy answer to such questioning is forthcoming, and Hasker offers no plausible answer. In any case, few, if any, people would be satisfied with a simple appeal to the profession of philosophy and its activities, given the substantial diversity of methods and perspectives within the profession.
Paul Tillich has identified an influential approach to the nature of philosophy, as follows: "Philosophy is the attempt to answer the most general questions about the nature of reality and human existence. Most general are those questions which do not ask about the nature of a specific sphere of reality (as the physical or the historical realms) but about the nature of reality, which is effective in all realms" (TILLICH 1957, 90) . This familiar approach captures the truth that philosophy pursues answers to general questions about reality, but we must not omit the role of philosophy in relation to particular disciplines. For instance, we have such established areas of philosophy as: philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of history, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of religion. Contrary to Tillich's characterization, these areas of philosophy ask about specific spheres of reality, in this case, specific spheres of philosophy. They do not "attempt to answer the most general questions about the nature of reality and human existence." So, we need a more qualified approach to philosophy.
We should consider a normative use of the terms "philosophy" and "philosophers" that avoids undue generality and can correct actual professional philosophy and its practices. Some professional philosophy can go by the name "philosophy" but neglect what is central to philosophy, normatively understood. If we consider the etymology of the term "philosophy," we may propose that as a practice, philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom with a certain breadth. Correspondingly, we may propose that as intellectual content, philosophy is what qualifies as a suitable intellectual product of such a practice aiming at wisdom with a certain breadth. (Given that the term "philosophy" has a certain vagueness in its use, we need not specify now an exact degree of breadth in the corresponding wisdom.) Professions, as suggested, sometimes become highly fractured in methods and perspectives, as in the case of the APA and SPEP. This can result from various distorting political and financial goals that do not line up with wisdom at all, or even the love and pursuit of wisdom. So, a profession going under the name "professional philosophy" may need correction.
Arguably, wisdom, like knowledge, is an objective reality in that it is not just what some "profession" says it is. In general, we may think of wisdom as a special kind of knowledge that enables us to identify and to prioritize our values and valued things and to guide our beliefs, plans, and actions in ways that are good and responsible (including responsible to our evidence). Philosophical wisdom has a certain generality or breadth about it, in part because philosophy values questions seeking an understanding of ultimate reality, or at least of where explanation ultimately ends. Not all philosophy, however, has the generality of metaphysics; for instance, the philosophy of mind is not as broad as metaphysics in scope.
We can include metaphysics (along with similar disciplines) in philosophy insofar as it figures crucially in philosophy's valued pursuit of questions seeking an understanding of ultimate reality. Physics, in contrast, belongs to science, not to philosophy, because it does not have the kind of breadth ex-pected of philosophy in its valued pursuit of questions seeking an understanding of ultimate reality. The same holds for chemistry, biochemistry, biology, physiology, astronomy, geology, and the social sciences. As for religion, it is not philosophy, because although it intends to participate in, or cooperate with, ultimate reality, it does not undertake inquiry with the breadth characteristic of philosophy. Philosophy has a certain personal detachment about it that religion typically omits in its participatory intentions.
Philosophy as the love and pursuit of wisdom with the kind of breadth just indicated can include such disciplines as the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of religion. The relevant consideration is that those sub-disciplines are integral to philosophy's valued pursuit of questions seeking an understanding of ultimate reality. In particular, those sub-disciplines in philosophy are integral to philosophy being able to identify their object-disciplines that fall short of philosophy's valued pursuit of questions seeking an understanding of ultimate reality. We thus can extend the term "philosophy" to those sub-disciplines, courtesy of their integral role in the broader project of philosophy as just characterized. The sciences typically proceed at a less general level of inquiry, and thus differ from philosophy as traditionally understood.
HASKER'S ALLEGATIONS
Hasker offers the following line of objection to my perspective on philosophy.
Moser does value philosophy, considered as the love and pursuit of spiritual wisdom. In contrast, however, he displays an extremely low opinion of the value of the things professional philosophers actually do -of the things in which the profession of philosophy largely consists, in the real world. To be sure, philosophers do sometimes continue their discussions long after there is nothing left worth discussing, and pursue at length minutia that are worth at best no more than a footnote. But these are easy targets; such foibles are common in many fields of study, and they are not characteristic of the best philosophical work. But to dismiss philosophical discussion as inherently diversionary, and to do so by placing it in competition with a Christian's obedience to God and to Christ, is another matter. If we put into practice Moser's restriction of acceptable philosophy to what is related to some particular need of the church, most of philosophy as we know it would disappear. His sweep-ing dismissal of historical minutia would, if accepted, negate the serious study of the history of philosophy. (HASKER 2016, 12-13) Hasker does not explain how he derives the undesirable interpretive results he alleges. This counts against the credibility of his interpretive allegations.
Hasker alleges that I "dismiss philosophical discussion as inherently diversionary, and . . . do so by placing it in competition with a Christian's obedience to God and to Christ." This broad allegation is false, and I have given no evidence to support this false allegation. Hasker is setting up a straw man, perhaps to make his case of dismissal quick and easy. At any rate, my criticism of philosophy, from the standpoint of Christian philosophy, extends only to a limited range of philosophy, a range that will make no contribution to philosophy done from a Christian perspective. Similarly, contrary to Hasker, I have not said anything to recommend that "most of philosophy as we know it would disappear," or to "negate the serious study of the history of philosophy." Instead, I have offered a highly limited criticism from the standpoint of Christian history of philosophy, bearing only on a range that will make no contribution to the history of philosophy done from a Christian perspective. It shows an unfortunate lack of imagination to infer the false interpretive conclusion that "most of philosophy [or the history of philosophy] as we know it" cannot contribute to a Christian approach to philosophy [or to a Christian approach to the history of philosophy].
I have no sweeping view to offer regarding the value of "the profession of philosophy," given its fractured status in methods and perspectives. It is clear, however, that such a fractured profession does not merit praise as a whole. So, we need a criterion to separate the good from the bad in philosophy as a profession. In saying this, I contradict Hasker's allegation that I "dismiss philosophical discussion as inherently diversionary," because I assume that there is some "good" in professional philosophy that needs to be separated from "the bad." (I have corrected some related misleading allegations in MOSER 2015.) In many Western societies, professional academic philosophy apparently has a monopoly on the discipline of philosophy, but this is more of an appearance than a reality. The discipline, broadly conceived, still allows for philosophers like Socrates without professional or academic affiliation. Philosophy, then, should not be characterized exclusively in terms of the activities of professional philosophers.
PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
What goes under the name "Christian philosophy" shows a wide-ranging diversity, in perspectives and methods, similar to that found in philosophy in general. The differences between "continental" and "analytic" approaches to Christian philosophy illustrate some of the diversity My own approach to Christian philosophy (presented in some detail in MOSER 2014, 2016a) offers philosophy under, or conformed to, God in Christ, and it gives a central role to a distinctive kind of wisdom, namely, God's wisdom in Christ.
If philosophy is the love and pursuit of wisdom with the kind of breadth identified above, Christian philosophy is the love and pursuit of God's wisdom under divine authority in Christ. Such authority calls for an ongoing volitional, affective, and intellectual union with Christ, including one's belonging to God in Christ. The relevant wisdom of God in Christ stands in sharp contrast with "human wisdom" (in the apostle Paul's language). If this approach to Christian philosophy offers some challenges to professional philosophy as ordinarily practiced, this result should be no surprise. In fact, such challenges are to be expected, and they no pose no objections to the approach on offer. In particular, we should expect such challenges given the transformative and redemptive kind of divine wisdom offered in God in Christ.
A vital question is whether we philosophers, among others, are sincerely willing to be conformed to the wisdom in God in Christ. Philosophers conformed to Christ are philosophers conformed to a new life of dying and rising with Christ, in the power of self-sacrificial agapē (unselfish love). This point involves philosophers conformed to Christ, because human agents, and not philosophical views, undergo the dying and rising with Christ. Going beyond ourselves as agents, our philosophy will be thus conformed to Christ when its motive and its content are subjected fully to the Good News of God in Christ. The conforming of philosophical content to Christ takes two variations. We may call the first variation of conforming "the strict-content variation." It includes philosophy that is explicitly Christian in conceptual content, involving positive claims regarding Jesus Christ, the Spirit of Christ, reconciliation to God in Christ, inward transformation by Christ, and so on. The strict-content variation will be significantly narrowing toward philosophy if one uses it to exclude all other variations of philosophy. One need not, however, use it in that exclusive manner. One could combine it with a different variation of philosophy that is inclusive of broader content, beyond explicitly Christian content.
We may call the second variation of content conforming to Christ "the Kingdom-enhancement variation." It requires philosophy, even if the philosophy lacks explicit Christian content, to contribute positively to a (perhaps broader) philosophy that (a) is explicitly Christian in substantive content and (b) enhances God's redemptive Kingdom under the Good News of God in Christ and its divine love commands. In contributing positively in the manner indicated, the second variation does not require that philosophy conformed to Christ be explicitly Christian in conceptual content. This kind of contributing can be genuine without itself offering explicitly Christian content. For instance, it can occur when a philosophical contribution illuminates an I-Thou direct interaction between humans and God (in Christ) without offering explicitly Christian content (see, for instance, BUBER 1923). In addition, we may use "contribute positively" broadly, to include the use of philosophical content to challenges criticisms of Christian faith in God (see 2 Corinthians 10:5).
The Kingdom-enhancement variation of philosophy can contribute to new human reconciliation to God and to deepened reconciliation with God. In addition, it can include a deepened understanding of God's redemptive ways. Because the reconciliation would be under divine agapē and its corresponding love commands, we should understand Kingdom-enhancement as the expanding or the deepening of God's kingdom of agapē. Being ultimately from God, Kingdom-enhancement would depend on the power of divine agapē, and that power could exist and work apart from Christian content in human beliefs or thoughts. A denial of that view would run afoul of the plausible view that the Spirit of God could prepare people in advance of their coming to consider and to receive Christian conceptual content. Even so, we may think of the relevant Kingdom-enhancement as being conformed to Christ, at least in a broad de re sense, given the New Testament view that Christ is, courtesy of God, the designated focus of the Kingdom (see, e.g., Mark 1:14-15, Luke 11:20, Matthew 12:28, 25:31-42, Colossians 1:13-14).
It would be unduly exclusive to prohibit doing philosophy in the Kingdom-enhancement variation and to allow for only the strict-content variation. Such narrowness, we should note, conflicts with the way various contributors of wisdom literature in the Hebrew Bible engaged with, and borrowed from, non-Hebraic wisdom traditions. If God is the ultimate intentional ground and sustainer of all wisdom, then wisdom is valuable wherever it arises, even outside the avowed people of God. We therefore should not promote a Christian ghetto with a monopoly on wisdom, including philosophical wisdom.
We are not left with the implausible view that "anything goes" in philosophy conformed to Christ or the equally implausible view that all philosophical truths or sound arguments are intrinsically valuable or worthy of human pursuit. The Kingdom-enhancement requirement for philosophy conformed to Christ sets a definite boundary with this standard: namely, enhancing God's redemptive Kingdom in a manner subjected to, or agreeable with, the Good News of God in Christ and its divine love commands. Mere truth-acquisition, even for philosophical truth, does not meet this standard. Some philosophical truths contribute positively to Kingdom-enhancement, but others do not (see, for instance, truths limited to the metaphysics of celestial time-travel for angels). This much should be clear, even if some cases call for patience and careful discernment, and even if some cases are disputable among humans.
For better or worse, we humans have finite resources, including finite time, in this life under the divine love commands. We thus should consider a triage approach to the topics we pursue in philosophy conformed to Christ, as in Christian life generally. We can distinguish between (a) the philosophical questions we may engage, if only briefly, to find out their positive contribution or the lack thereof to Kingdom-enhancement and (b) the questions we may pursue as a research focus in a Christian life, as an evident positive contribution to Kingdom-enhancement. A new question for us may be a straightforward candidate for category (a), but category (b) is more demanding. As a research focus, philosophy conformed to Christ (and Christian inquiry in general conformed to Christ) should be attentive to (b) in a manner often neglected. Part of the neglect of the distinction between (a) and (b) may come from the dubious view that any philosophical inquiry or truth is intrinsically valuable or otherwise worthy of human pursuit. I see no good reason to accept the latter view, even if our field of options for inquiry can raise some epistemic problems regarding which truths are actually Kingdom-enhancing. We should expect such problems to be familiar realities of the cognitively limited human predicament.
The perspective on offer allows us to acknowledge the importance of being "Christ-shaped" with regard to the mode and the ultimate purpose of Christian philosophy (and other truth-seeking disciplines submitted to God in Christ). Here we can find a faithful criterion, in being Christ-shaped, for separating the good from the bad in professional philosophy, at least for the sake of Christian philosophy. This criterion calls for a detailed explanation beyond the scope of this paper, but it does point us in the right direction for Christian philosophy. I suggest, for instance, that doing mathematics via the received power of God in Christ, with the accompanying fruit of God's Spirit (e.g., love, joy, peace, kindness, patience), and for the ultimate honor of God in Christ, will look different in a personal and an interpersonal mode (even if not in content) from doing mathematics otherwise. I submit that the same is true for philosophy, in terms of a personal and an interpersonal mode. By way of contrast, we often see a harshly competitive interpersonal mode in academic pursuits. The criterion of being Christ-shaped in inquiry would prohibit such a mode.
A philosophy will not be "Christ-shaped" just because it includes truths and sound arguments that are philosophical. Something more is needed to satisfy the exalted normative character of being Christ-shaped. We might say that a philosophical argument is (objectively) good because it is sound, but it does not follow that it is good in a different, redemptively significant manner: particularly, in virtue of being a central component of a Christ-shaped philosophy. Philosophy done for the redemptive purpose of the honor of God in Christ differs, at least in intention, from philosophy done just to accumulate truths and sound arguments (and avoid falsehoods and bad arguments) in philosophy. Clearly, not all truths and sound arguments in philosophy are redemptively significant, from a Christian point of view, even if we have a hard time discerning relevant differences in some cases.
Redemptive significance, according to the Christian Good News, depends on God's plan of redemption as reconciliation to God in Christ (de re if not de dicto). As Paul remarks, "through him [= Christ] God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven" (Colossians 1:20, NRSV). (For a de re illustration, in the absence of Christian de dicto content, see .) The general mission of the body of Christ, the church, is to exemplify and to extend such divinely empowered reconciliation to all people willing to consider it. The demonstration of God's agapē in the self-sacrificial cross of Christ is at the center of this redemptive plan, but this does not exhaust the plan. The convicting and upbuilding work of God's Spirit is also crucial to the plan, as Paul suggests in Romans 5:5: "Hope [in God] does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us" (cf. MOSER 2016a). This remark concerns a distinctive kind of evidence in agapē of divine reality that saves one from cognitive disappointment regarding hope and faith in God. Even so, humans must cooperate with God's Spirit to make the redemption as reconciliation to God actual for themselves. In particular, hu-mans must share the response of Jesus to God in Gethsemane: Not my will but Your will. (For the details of this approach to redemption and its bearing on faith in God and knowing God, see MOSER 2013.) In Christ-shaped inquiry, including philosophy, a key question is: How are we to pursue the questions (including philosophical questions) that attract our attention? God, being morally perfect, would care about this, even if we do not. Will we pursue the questions to the neglect or the disadvantage of other people? Will we thereby exclude ourselves from the divine love commands? How we pursue questions is not an ethically neutral matter, as if God would not care. In addition, we need not exclude any profound or important philosophical question from Christian philosophy, as long as the question is pursued in keeping with the love commands and contributes positively to the redemptive project of God in Christ. We do not need a complete list now of what would thus contribute in order to use my proposed criterion, just as we do not need a full list of foods to recommend that people eat food.
A philosophy will be Christ-shaped only if it is an integral part of God's redemptive movement grounded in Christ. From a Christ-shaped redemptive perspective, a philosophy with no positive contribution to that movement will amount to fiddling while Rome burns. The redemptive task in question requires self-giving trust in God as part of its mode. As a result, Paul states that "whatever does not proceed from faith [in God] is sin," where sin includes alienation from God and God's redemptive mission (Romans 14:23, NRSV) . Following Paul, we thus should expect two contrasting kinds of philosophy and wisdom: philosophy and wisdom integral to God's redemptive effort in Christ, and "human" philosophy and wisdom that are not thus integral (for details, see chapters 1 and 2 of 1 Corinthians). It is unclear how Hasker's welcoming embrace of professional philosophy as a unit can accommodate the present distinction from Paul.
Hasker raises an objection in connection with my Pauline distinction between two kinds of wisdom and philosophy, as follows:
Moser is not consistent in using 'philosophy' and 'philosopher'. . . . When he says that Christian philosophy has neglected the "unique flood of God's agapē in Christ," it is clear that 'philosophy' has gone back to its more accustomed, professional connotation: Moser is saying that the things said and written by professional Christian philosophers are lacking in this respect. But if the meaning of 'philosophy' shifts back and forth in this way it is becoming a source of confusion, something we need to be on guard against as we read his articles . . . . So there are two sorts of wisdom, and, if you like, two kinds of "philosophy." No harm in that, so long as we are clear about the distinction between the kinds. Moser, however, tends to conflate them, and I have come to see that this conflation is the key to the entire strategy of his proposal for "Christshaped philosophy." (HASKER 2016, 11-12) The allegation that I "tend to conflate" the two kinds of wisdom and philosophy would need evidence of a pattern of conflation, but Hasker does not deliver the needed evidence. One can speak broadly of a "Christian philosophy" as being Christian while it neglects an important aspect of a robust Christian philosophy, such as the aforementioned epistemic lesson of Romans 5:5. This would not require one's "tending to conflate" different kinds of philosophy. So, Hasker's charge misses the mark.
Hasker offers the following bold claim without any supporting evidence: "I have come to see that this conflation [between two kinds of wisdom and philosophy] is the key to the entire strategy of his proposal for 'Christshaped philosophy'." Hasker fails to justify this claim, and I can find no plausible case for it. He may believe this claim, but it is doubtful that he "sees" it. At least, an impartial reader will expect a careful case for it, and will not be convinced in the absence of such a case. The actual, straightforward key to my strategy for Christ-shaped philosophy is the nature of God and God's wisdom in Christ, coupled with the bearing of this nature on distinctively Christian philosophy. It shows a serious misunderstanding of Christ-shaped philosophy, or at least a bad polemical strategy, to look for the key elsewhere.
Hasker is uneasy about my suggestion that Jesus and Paul are model philosophers, given the sense of "philosophy" I have suggested. If Jesus and Paul do not model the love and pursuit of wisdom of the kind characterized above, then I do not know who does. Indeed, if they do not, then nobody else does either. The fact that Jesus and Paul did not pay dues to a "professional" society like the APA or SPEP or teach in a philosophy department does not challenge their being models of the love and pursuit of wisdom of the relevant kind. Hasker's position would impose a profession-centered standard on Jesus and Paul even though that standard has no essential connection to the love and pursuit of wisdom of the relevant kind, or to philosophy as traditionally understood.
Hasker shows significant misunderstanding of my position in the following remarks:
Quite simply, our aim in philosophy should be the truth, and while not all truths are equal in value and importance, truth is under-valued if we suppose that only those truths are worth knowing that have become an issue at some point in time for the life of the Christian church. Moser's strictures may also underestimate the systematic nature of the philosophical enterprise. Questions that on their face seem to have little relevance to broad worldview concerns may unexpectedly come to play an important role in the construction of one's overall philosophical perspective. (HASKER 2016, 21) I nowhere have said or suggested that "only those truths are worth knowing that have become an issue at some point in time for the life of the Christian church." That claim is so implausible in its exclusiveness that it amounts to setting up a straw man.
According to the perspective on Christian philosophy outlined above (and in MOSER 2014 and 2016a), a "Kingdom-enhancement variation" of philosophy requires philosophy suitable to Christian philosophy, even if the former philosophy has no explicit Christian content. In particular, it requires philosophy to contribute positively to a philosophy that (a) is Christian in substantive content and (b) enhances God's redemptive Kingdom under the Good News of God in Christ and its divine love commands. If we were to formulate this in terms of the mission of the church, we would not set a requirement, contrary to Hasker, in terms of "truths . . . that have become an issue at some point in time for the life of the Christian church." This is obviously too restrictive, and it sets up a straw man. A plausible formulation could appeal to truths that evidently will or easily would become an issue for the life of the Christian church. That formulation calls for refinement beyond the scope of this article, but it does not admit of easy dismissal in the way Hasker's chosen formulation does. Again, he takes the easy shot that misses the mark.
Christian faith in God, as characterized earlier in this issue in my "Reason and Faith in God" (MOSER 2016b), neither is philosophy nor requires philosophy for its existence or reasonableness. It is not philosophy because it is not inquiry or commitment with the breadth characteristic of philosophy. It does not require philosophy, because it does not require inquiry or commitment with the breadth characteristic of philosophy. Christian faith in God does require one's having evidence for God's reality, but one's having such evidence neither is philosophy nor requires philosophy. In particular, Christian faith in God requires one's self-entrustment to God in a way that entails one's committing to participate cooperatively, if only de re, in God's perfectly good will. Such self-entrustment neither is nor requires philosophy for its existence or reasonableness. God can and does provide the needed evidence without any needed reliance on philosophy (as suggested by Romans 5:5).
The value of some philosophy for Christian faith is instrumental, and not intrinsic. It contributes abductively and extrinsically, that is, in explanatory ways that go beyond the evidence needed to underwrite faith in God. (For a good example, see NIEBUHR 1949; cf. RICHARDSON 1956 , GILKEY 2001 Those explanatory ways are epistemically valuable, and thus, owing to the systematic nature of explanation, we can set aside Hasker's worry that I "underestimate the systematic nature of the philosophical enterprise." Even so, the relevant philosophical explanations have a generality that exceeds the needed evidence for an individual's faith in God. In the perspective I favor, the apologetic contributions of philosophy have a secondary status relative to faith in God and its needed evidence. They do not decide the matter of the epistemic reasonableness of faith in God, but they can supplement crucial evidence for such faith. Christian philosophers and apologists would do well to keep this lesson explicit, if only to avoid misleading people about what is crucial to Christian faith in God.
